Article 2 of 2
The situation in Deir al-Balah continues to deteriorate. Humanitarian space is shrinking and the operating environment is becoming more volatile by the day. For organisations still operating inside Gaza, the priority now is to adapt quickly, act with discipline, and plan with care.
This second article offers practical direction for humanitarian teams. It focuses on how to approach rotations, equip incoming staff, support access personnel, and sustain those already under extreme strain.
Plan for what you might have to do, not just what you hope to do
Organisations should maintain a clear commitment to essential presence. That means rotating in only those staff who are mission-critical, properly prepared, and ready to operate in degraded and unpredictable conditions. Incoming personnel must be capable of managing the role they are stepping into, as well as the possibility that departure may be delayed or denied.
Rotations should always be planned with contingency in mind. That includes appropriate equipment, medical preparedness, backup options, and the ability to extend. A strong presence is not about numbers. It is about readiness.
Every rotation is a logistics opportunity
No one should enter Gaza without taking the full opportunity to carry in what is needed. Every pocket and pouch matters. Inbound personnel should bring in the maximum they are allowed, prioritising what supports collective continuity and local operations.
This includes communications tools, power banks, tracking devices, water filters, food supplements, charging equipment, and medical supplies. Certain trauma-level medical equipment, in the hands of trained staff, may save lives. These tools only make sense if those carrying them know how to use them under pressure. The reality may involve extended periods without external medical support. Teams must be able to stabilise and sustain casualties in remote or isolated conditions.
Personnel should also bring what they would need if departure were blocked. What is carried in may be what sustains a colleague, a neighbour, or a team when the next rotation cannot get through.
Build for continuity, not dependency
Rotations should not rely on a single individual being available at all times. People fall ill, become exhausted, or are unable to re-enter. Effective rotations allow for this.
Organisations should ensure coverage by having multiple personnel briefed and ready, not only in title but in practice. This is not about building a second tier. It is about building resilience into the team itself. Where people cannot rotate out as planned, the pressure intensifies. Planning must recognise that and prepare for it.
Support your security and access staff
Security and access personnel are operating under immense pressure. Many are responsible for wide areas and large caseloads, with little practical support. Some are balancing operational continuity with real-time threats and near misses. Others are managing risk with little input or backing from leadership structures.
They need resourced systems, executive-level backing, and freedom to act on what they know. Decisions under pressure depend on whether those closest to the context are trusted and supported to lead. That includes reinforcing a strict approach to deconfliction, proper communications planning, and regular contact with those who are maintaining humanitarian space on behalf of others.
Deconfliction cannot work without functioning communications. That means layered systems, multiple power sources, redundancy across platforms, and tested protocols that can withstand outages.
On presence, principles, and what is said under pressure
In every high-risk response, there are moments when judgement and principle collide. One of those is when a party to the conflict asks who is on site. Are there internationals? Are there nationals?
In some situations, silence has been advised. But silence is not always neutral. In certain contexts, it can increase exposure. It can create ambiguity where clarity might offer protection.
Well-intentioned messaging can begin to sound like instruction. Statements made by organisations, or on behalf of groups of organisations, do not always reflect the positions or lived risks of the individuals on the ground. This is not a decision to be made solely by country directors, regional coordinators, or senior leadership figures. It is a decision that requires clear articulation, constant review, and practical engagement with those who will carry the consequences.
Informed consent must not be treated as a token. It cannot be reduced to a principle agreed on a slide deck. It must be real. It must be applied in context.
If the decision is not to share who is on site, that must be understood and owned. If a response must be given, then saying both that national and international staff are present may be safer than saying one or saying nothing. This is not about misrepresentation. It is about recognising that clarity, in some cases, offers more protection than silence. If only one group is named, that decision must be recorded and understood for what it may lead to.
This is not a rejection of principle. It is an insistence that principles must be applied in full awareness of the risks. Decisions must not be frozen in place or inherited without reflection. This is not the moment for slogans. It is the moment to protect people.
Final note
This is not the time to assume that national colleagues can go further. That belief, whether stated or silent, has ended too often in harm. It should never be the basis for operational planning.
Even the most capable and committed staff can be drawn into unsafe actions by the collective pressure to push further. That extra yard should only be taken when everyone involved understands the risks, has been given the choice, and agrees that it is necessary for saving lives in the here and now. Otherwise, it is not worth the cost.
This is the time to reduce exposure, not extend it. To sustain presence, not stretch it thin. To keep people alive, not ask them to endure more for the sake of appearances or reputations.
For those inside Gaza, colleagues and civilians alike, none of this is theoretical. It is lived. It is heavy. WillowFlow writes this article having spoken with both national and international colleagues throughout the development of these articles and immediately before publication. Their input has been both objective and deeply personal. It is informed also by the experience of WillowFlow consultants who have worked in and on Gaza across the past year. We share it in solidarity and in hope that it may be of practical value to those who are still carrying out the work.
